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ABSTRACT 
After the collapse in the early years of transition, saving rates in many EU accession countries 
have recovered and remained stable during recent years. This may indicate that the 
transformation process has come to an end with regard to savings. Is saving behaviour in EU 
accession countries now driven by the same forces as it is in market economies? We use a 
panel data set covering the years 1990 to 1999 to estimate fixed-effects models for domestic 
and private saving ratios. Our central findings are: saving rates are persistent; income, growth 
and institutional reforms cause saving to increase, whereas public saving crowds out private 
saving. Domestic saving and foreign capital are operating as substitutes. 
Keywords: Panel data, savings, EU accession countries, transformation  
JEL-classification: C33, E21, P2  
 
 
 
                                                             
* DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research, e-mail for Mechtihild Schrooten: mschrooten@diw.de; 
e-mail for Sabine Stephan: sstephan@diw.de. We are grateful to Frank Brandes, Joerg Breitung, Paul Gregory, 
Daniel Piazolo, Wolfram Schrettl, Philipp Schroeder and Juergen Wolters for discussions and comments on an 
earlier version of the paper.  
   
1 
BACK ON TRACK? 
SAVINGS PUZZLES IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES 
ENEPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 23 
MECHTHILD SCHROOTEN & 
SABINE STEPHAN 
 
1. Motivation   
Saving rates differ widely around the world. The dynamics of saving have been an issue for 
many developing countries and emerging markets, namely in Latin America and Asia. Their 
experiences clearly show that there is a close relationship between domestic savings, domestic 
investment and growth. If capital were perfectly mobile, however, then changes in domestic 
investment would be independent of changes in domestic saving. Thus, the importance of 
domestic saving for domestic investment depends on a country’s actual access to the 
international capital market and on the degree of its integration into international financial 
markets (Feldstein & Horioka 1980). The transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), like other emerging economies, have only limited access to international financial 
markets – owing to specific macroeconomic and institutional risks. Therefore, the 
mobilisation of domestic saving is a very important factor in the ability of these countries to 
finance their own catching-up processes. This is especially pertinent for those transition 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have applied to join the European Union (which 
we refer to in the following as the EU accession countries). A fairly high level of domestic 
saving is therefore considered to be a basic requirement for these countries, to ensure 
economic development and future prosperity.  
In fact, after the sharp decline in domestic saving that took place during the early years of 
transition, saving rates in many EU accession countries soon recovered and have remained 
relatively stable during recent years. But what are the motives behind domestic saving in these 
countries? Is saving in EU accession countries now driven by the same forces as it is in 
market economies? Does this mean that the transition countries are “back on track” with their 
saving patterns?  
Up to now research focusing on saving patterns in EU accession countries is still pending. 
Studies based on large international data sets, including both industrialised and emerging 
economies exclude the CEE economies in transition (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, 
1999). Usually, these studies explain trends in domestic and private saving, and do so mainly 
through growth and age structure (Edwards 1995; Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, 
1998; Bailliu & Reisen, 1998; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, 2000). The small amount 
of literature on saving (domestic as well as private) in CEE transition countries, focuses on 
groups of selected transformation countries at an early stage of transition (Denizer & Wolf, 
2000; Denizer, Wolf & Ying, 2000; IMF 2000) and presents contradictory results.
1 
Therefore, this paper attempts to fill at least three analytical gaps: First, our study is based on 
a panel data set that contains all EU accession countries formerly belonging to the Eastern 
bloc (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia) and it covers the whole transition period – the years 1990-1999 
                                                             
1 These empirical studies differ significantly in terms of definitions of domestic and private saving, choice of 
explanatory variables, country set, underlying time horizon and methodological approach. ___________________________________  SCHROOTEN  & STEPHAN  _________________________________  
2 
for the CEE countries except the Baltics and the period of 1992-1999 for the Baltic countries. 
Second, we analyse both domestic and private saving in EU accession countries. Besides the 
standard macroeconomic and demographic variables, we additionally check for the influence 
of the institutional development in the countries under consideration using a transition 
indicator recently constructed by the EBRD.
2 This general transition indicator is calculated as 
the average of four different partial transition indicators, which reflect the state of enterprise 
restructuring, competition policy, and bank and security market reforms in the countries under 
consideration. 
Third, since the transformation period is a very short time span for an econometric analysis, 
we have to make efficient use of the information contained in the data. We meet this 
requirement by applying panel estimation techniques (fixed-effects model) to take advantage 
of the information content contained in both the time series and the cross-sectional dimension 
of the data. Regarding the estimation, we followed the approach of Beck and Katz (Beck & 
Katz 1995 and 1996), who proved that especially for small panel data sets, the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method with panel-corrected standard errors should be applied. This rather 
simple approach yields accurate standard errors whereas the application of the Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS) method would lead to an underestimation of the variability of the 
estimated coefficients. 
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2, various stylised facts on saving in the 
countries under consideration in the pre-transition period are discussed and then contrasted 
with the development during transition. In section 3, the database is presented. In section 4, 
we briefly discuss some econometric issues concerning panel data and describe the estimation 
approach. Empirical findings are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents the study’s 
conclusions.  
2.  Stylised Facts  
Domestic saving rates were exceptionally high in Central Eastern European countries during 
the socialist era. In the 1980s, average saving rates of around 30% were reported for these 
countries, while in the industrialised world, domestic saving rates reached only about 20% of 
gross domestic product. And in contrast to “Western” saving, which tended to decline, 
socialist saving rates actually exhibited an upward trend. Saving rates within the socialist bloc, 
however, differed widely (Figure 1). While Poland was on top with a domestic saving rate of 
about 43% in 1989, saving rates in Estonia and Lithuania only reached about 26%.  
It is assumed that saving during the socialist era was mainly driven by three factors: first, 
there was “planned” saving, which was necessary for funding “centrally planned” investment. 
Second, the lack of consumer goods (Denizer & Wolf, 2000 and 1998) motivated what was 
called “involuntary” or “forced” saving. Third, although neglected in most analyses, voluntary 
private saving also took place, in particular to finance durable consumer goods.  
 
                                                             
2 We are grateful to Daniel Piazolo, who provided us with the extended version of the EBRD transition indicator 
covering the whole period under consideration. ___________________  BACK ON TRACK? SAVINGS PUZZLES IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES   _________________  
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Figure 1. Pre-transition domestic saving rates (1989) 
As a percentage of GDP                     
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Sources: National Statistics, World Development Indicators, authors’ own calculations. 
 
With the beginning of the transformation process, domestic saving rates declined significantly 
in all the countries under consideration (Figure 2). At first glance, the drop in saving rates 
following the start of the transformation process can be interpreted as a reaction to the 
consumption constraint and savings overhang inherited from the past. At least one other factor 
should also be taken into account: the massive uncertainty at the beginning of the 
transformation process. Inflation rates reached very high levels, GDP dropped, unemployment 
rose and the outcome of the transformation process as a whole seemed completely uncertain. 
Under these conditions, it is remarkable that domestic saving rates did not end up being 
negative in the initial years of transformation (Table 1). In fact, saving rates in many EU 
accession countries recovered soon after their collapse in the early phase of transition and 
have remained relatively stable during recent years. The recovery, however, seems to follow 
different patterns within this group of countries: In Romania and Bulgaria, saving rates 
stabilised on a fairly low level of about 15%. Saving rates in the Baltics are relatively low too, 
but Estonia and Lithuania showed comparably low saving rates during the socialist era as 
well. Currently, saving rates in these five countries are 30% below the average saving rate in 
EU member countries. In contrast to this, domestic saving rates in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia quickly recovered after the drop at the 
beginning of the transition period and clearly exceeded the EU-member states’ average during 
recent years. ___________________________________  SCHROOTEN  & STEPHAN  _________________________________  
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Figure 2: Gross domestic saving rates in EU and EU accession countries 
As a percentage of GDP 
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EU: without Luxembourg; unweighted average.  
I: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia; unweighted average. 
II: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; unweighted average. 
III: Bulgaria, Romania; unweighted average. 
 
It can be taken for granted that the determinants of both domestic and private saving have 
changed considerably during transition; this period commenced with high levels of 
involuntary saving and is expected to end with market-driven saving. Does this imply that 
saving in the EU accession countries is now driven by the same forces as it is in market 
economies? _______________________________________________   BACK ON TRACK? SAVINGS PUZZLES IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES   _____________________________________________  
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Table 1. Gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP 
             
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Czech  Republic  30.6 27.8 30.1 27.2 28.2 27.1 29.3 28.6 26.8 28.3 26.9 
Hungary  29.9 28.0 19.5 15.8 11.8 15.7 22.7 26.1 27.7 27.6 26.3 
Poland  42.7 31.6 17.1 15.8 15.5 19.9 22.1 20.3 20.2 21.0 20.0 
Slovak  Republic  28.5 24.2 28.2 24.1 22.5 27.2 29.1 25.6 26.8 25.2 26.5 
Slovenia  33.0 32.0 26.4 24.7 20.4 23.2 21.7 22.5 23.1 24.1 23.9 
Bulgaria  31.4 22.0 26.9 14.1 7.7  8.8  14.1 11.5 16.9 13.7 11.3 
Romania  29.5 20.8 24.1 23.0 24.0 22.7 18.7 16.3 14.5 13.3 15.7 
             
Average    32.2 26.6 24.6 20.7 18.6 20.7 22.5 21.6 22.3 21.9 21.5 
             
Estonia  25.9 22.3 34.5 32.7 22.6 18.6 18.4 16.3 19.3 19.0 18.8 
Latvia  34.7 38.8 43.5 48.1 25.0 20.8 15.2 10.7 14.3 14.1 15.4 
Lithuania  25.8 25.2 28.5 19.2 11.4 12.4 12.9 14.7 16.0 12.5 12.6 
             
Baltics Average   28.8  28.8  35.5  33.3 19.7 17.2 15.5 13.9 16.5 15.2 15.6 
             
Total  Average  31.2 27.3 27.9 24.5 18.9 19.6 20.4 19.3 20.6 19.9 19.8 
             
Sources: National Statistics, World Development Indicators, authors' own calculations. ___________________________________  SCHROOTEN  & STEPHAN  _________________________________  
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3. Database 
A large amount of work has already been done on the empirical determinants of saving in 
market economies. But the analysis of saving behaviour is traditionally plagued by data 
problems. In this paper, the time series used for domestic savings are those published by the 
World Bank in the “World Development Indicators”. Nevertheless household savings and 
enterprise savings are unavailable for most of the countries under consideration. 
Consequently, there is no other choice but to calculate private savings
3 indirectly. We decided 
to construct private savings by subtracting public savings from domestic savings, using the 
overall government budget deficit as a proxy for public (dis-)savings. Although this approach 
can be questioned because of its use of simplified assumptions, it remains the approach most 
commonly taken if the data situation is comparatively poor (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & 
Servén, 2000) and offers the advantage of allowing us to compare our findings with those in 
the literature. Figure 3 illustrates how domestic and private savings are composed.  
Figure 3. Definition of private and domestic savings 
Household savings     
 Private  savings   
Enterprise savings      Domestic savings 
Public savings     
 
 
Given that this study assesses the driving forces behind domestic and private savings, two 
different equations were formulated. In the first regression, the dependent variable is the ratio 
of gross domestic savings to GDP, while in the second, it is the ratio of private savings to 
GDP. We are aware of the fact that there are more appropriate methods to calculate the saving 
ratios, e.g. using disposable income as a base (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, 2000), but 
unfortunately these figures are unavailable for the countries under consideration. Therefore, 
we have to follow the simple approach that has also been used by Denizer and Wolf (1998). 
The explanatory variables are as follows:  
Persistence in saving behaviour 
•  domestic (private) saving ratio of the previous period to account for persistence in 
domestic (private) saving patterns;  
Income variables 
•  annual growth rate of real GDP measured in constant 1995 US-dollars as a proxy for 
income growth; and,  
•  log of real GDP per capita measured in constant 1995 US-dollars as a proxy for the 
income level;  
(It is possible that saving is determined simultaneously with the income growth and the 
income level. If an endogeneity problem of this kind exists, the estimated coefficients will 
be biased and inconsistent. Therefore, appropriate instrument variables have to be used. 
Since the income level and the income growth variables are reasonably correlated over 
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time, the income level of the previous period and the income growth of the previous 
period are appropriate instruments and have thus been chosen for use in the regressions.) 
Uncertainty 
•  inflation measured as the annual growth rate of the consumer price index
4 and 
interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty; 
Financial market performance 
•  real interest rate calculated as nominal deposit rate minus the inflation rate of the 
previous period,
5 to take expectations concerning future price development into 
account; 
•  credit provision for the private sector as a percentage of GDP is used as an indicator 
for consumers’ access to domestic borrowing; 
•  M2/nominal GDP is used as a proxy for financial depth and the performance of the 
domestic financial market; 
Demographics 
•  youth and old-age dependency ratio, defined as people aged 0-14 and 65-and-over to 
the working age population, to account for unequal income flows over the life-cycle; 
International financial integration 
•  current account deficit as a percentage of GDP is used as a proxy for international 
borrowing and therefore for international financial integration; 
Institutional development 
•  an extended version of the EBRD transition indicator as a proxy for the progress made 
as part of the process of transition. Here, progress is measured against the standards of 
industrialised market economies. The indicator is constructed as the average of 
“transformation” in the areas of enterprise restructuring, competition policy, as well as 
bank and security sector reforms. The measurement scale for the single indicators 
ranges from 1 to 4.25, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigidly planned 
economy and 4.25 represents the standard of an industrialised market economy. 
Fiscal policy 
•  When testing the determinants of the private saving ratio, we additionally used the 
public saving ratio as an explanatory variable in order to check whether Ricardian 
effects on private saving can be detected.  
The countries included in the data set are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (N=10). The 
regressions are based on annual data taken from the World Bank “World Development 
Indicators”, the EBRD Transition Report, IMF International Financial Statistics and from 
national statistics (see Appendix, Table A1 for details). Since the study focuses on the 
transition period, the data covers the period of 1990-1999 for the Central Eastern European 
countries, except the Baltics, and the period of 1992-1999 for the Baltic countries (Fischer, 
Sahay & Vegh, 1996). The data underwent extensive checks to make them comparable and 
compatible.  
                                                             
4 ln(1+πt) 
5 ln(1+it)-ln(1+πt-1) ___________________________________  SCHROOTEN  & STEPHAN  _________________________________  
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4. Econometric  Issues 
In this study, we estimated fixed-effects models to empirically assess the determinants of 
domestic and private saving. This type of model is basically an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression that includes a dummy variable for each country to account for country-specific 
effects. Therefore, it is often referred to as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model 
(Verbeek, 2000). The OLS method is optimal if error processes have the same variance 
(homoscedasticity) and all of the error processes are independent of each other. Nevertheless, 
the panel data are typically plagued by complicated error processes (Beck & Katz, 1995): 
•  panel heteroscedasticity (i.e. variances of the error processes differ from 
country to country); 
•  contemporaneous correlation (i.e. large errors for country i at time t will often 
be associated with large errors for country j at time t); and, 
•  serial correlation (i.e. errors for each country show temporal dependence 
[autocorrelation]). 
Suppose that autocorrelation is eliminated from the data, but panel heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation is still present. In this case, OLS yields consistent estimates, but 
OLS is not optimal: in other words, other estimators exist that are more efficient. But a much 
more serious problem is that OLS standard errors are unreliable. Since one usually assumes 
that panel data inherit this complicated error processes, Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
methods that account for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation are often 
used instead. Nevertheless, Beck and Katz (Beck & Katz, 1995 and 1996) showed that these 
approaches significantly underestimate the variability of the estimated coefficients, especially 
if the sample size is small. This means that researchers risk relying on estimation results that 
are in fact not statistically significant. In order to avoid this pitfall, Beck and Katz suggest the 
following approach: first, the problem of serial correlation can be solved including the lagged 
endogenous variable as an additional regressor in the estimation equation. Then the dynamic 
model is estimated applying the OLS method, but using panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) that account for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation to assure 
reliable standard errors. In this study, we followed the suggestions of Beck and Katz and 
estimated dynamic fixed-effects models with panel-corrected standard errors.
6, 7 
Since our panel data set is quite small, we have to keep an eye on the degrees of freedom 
when specifying the models. Therefore, we started with a small model including the 
potentially most relevant saving determinants: lagged endogenous variable, lagged income 
growth, lagged income level, dependency ratios, inflation, current account deficit, and 
additionally, the public saving rate when testing the determinants of the private saving ratio. 
Step by step, insignificant variables were excluded from the model until a “core” specification 
was achieved. Then additional potentially relevant saving determinants were checked one by 
                                                             
6 All the estimations were performed using Stata 7.0. 
7 We are aware of the fact that the LSDV model with a lagged dependent variable generates downward biased 
estimates when the time series dimension (T) of the panel is small. Based on the results of their Monte Carlo 
study, Judson and Owen (1999) conclude that the bias is not that important for the explanatory variables but for 
the lagged dependent variable, especially if the time series is highly autoregressive. For panels with a small T, 
they therefore recommend a corrected LSDV estimator, but this technique is still unavailable for unbalanced 
panels like ours. Concerning our study, we believe that the bias problem does not adversely effect our results, 
since the saving rates are not highly persistent and we are primarily interested in the sign of the determining 
factors of saving and not in the exact coefficients. Nevertheless, we can confirm the size of the estimated 
coefficient for the lagged private saving rate on the basis of a recent but yet unpublished study where we used a 
GMM estimator, which yields unbiased estimates. ___________________   BACK ON TRACK? SAVINGS PUZZLES IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES   ________________  
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one to see whether they fit into the model. In the following, only the final specifications of the 
fixed-effects models for domestic and private saving ratios are presented (Tables 2a and 2b). 
The country-specific effects are significant and not reported in the tables. Estimation results 
for the other model specifications are presented in the Appendix (Table A2a and Table A2b). 
5. Empirical  Results 
It is striking that both gross domestic and private saving ratios of the countries under 
consideration are to a large extent determined by the same variables and that even their 
coefficients are quite similar (Tables 2a and 2b). Therefore, we discuss the estimation results 
for both equations together and point out where differences occur.  
Persistence in saving behaviour 
Savings rates of the previous period have a positive and highly significant effect on 
today’s saving rates; i.e. savings rates show a certain degree of persistence. Therefore, 
inheriting high saving rates from the socialist era had a stabilising impact on saving during 
transition. This may explain why saving rates never became negative in the countries 
under consideration even during the difficult first years of transition. Our results on 
persistence of saving are in line with the results reported by Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Servén (1999) using the World Bank data set covering 150 industrialised and non-
transition emerging economies. 
Income variables 
The instrument variables for the income growth and the income level (i.e. real GDP 
growth of the previous period and real GDP per capita of the previous period) are 
positively related to saving as well. In other words, an increase in economic growth or in 
per-capita income in period t-1 leads to an increase in saving in period t. Whereas growth 
positively affects both domestic and private savings,
8 the impact of per-capita income was 
only significant in the regression for the private saving ratio. The positive influence of 
income level and growth is reported in many empirical studies, especially on private 
savings, which usually have the lion’s share of domestic savings (Masson, Bayoumi & 
Samiei, 1995; Edwards, 1996). Here again we can state that EU accession countries 
behave like other market economies in this respect. In our model, however, we cannot 
distinguish between changes in savings caused by permanent and temporary changes in 
income levels.  
Demographics 
For the dependency ratios, negative signs are reported. This means that on an aggregate 
level a higher proportion of people not belonging to the work force and therefore with 
little or no income reduces domestic saving. Concerning private savings this finding is in 
line with the life-cycle hypothesis. According to this theory, individuals achieve their 
highest savings at the point of their highest earnings, i.e. during their working life. 
Correspondingly, it is assumed that individuals have negative saving rates both when they 
are young and also during their retirement, when their income is generally low. In our 
study, both the youth and the old-age dependency ratio displayed the expected negative 
signs. Nevertheless, the youth dependency ratio was not included in the final model 
specifications because this variable was no longer significant. The negative impact of the 
dependency ratios on domestic as well as on private savings is a common result for 
                                                             
8 Since the lagged growth rate of real GDP had a significant positive impact on private savings in model 1-6, we 
also kept it in the final specification even its significance was slightly below the 10% level.  ___________________________________  SCHROOTEN  & STEPHAN  _________________________________  
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country sets covering industrialised and emerging market economies (e.g. Callen & 
Thimann 1997, Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, 1999). Nevertheless, Denizer and 
Wolf (1998 and 2000), who analysed the determinants of the domestic saving ratio for a 
group 25 transition countries (CEE countries, Baltic states and non-Baltic successor states 
of the former Soviet Union) during the early period of transition, stated that the 
dependency ratio displayed the expected negative sign, but was always insignificant. This 
leads us to the conclusion that during the early years of transition, levelling out uneven 
income flows over the life-cycle was not the main motive for saving because of the sharp 
decline in income, tremendous uncertainty and the non-existence of a high-performing 
banking sector. Since then, however, a notable degree of certainty has been achieved, 
enabling people to begin expanding their planning horizons. 
Institutional development 
With the implementation of better, stable and market-oriented institutions, not only 
individuals but also the government can expand its planning horizon. In our approach we 
measured the influence of the institutional framework on saving using the EBRD 
transition indicator. We found that the lagged EBRD transition indicator positively affects 
savings; in other words an improvement in the institutional development in period t-1 
leads to higher savings in period t. The current institutional development also exerts a 
positive effect on current saving, but is not statistically significant (Tables A2i and A2ii, 
Appendix). According to our results, better institutions facilitate the levelling out of 
consumption over the life-time; i.e. during the transition period the implementation of 
reliable institutions promotes saving. At first glance, this finding may be surprising 
because one usually expects that better institutions reduce uncertainty and as a 
consequence saving will decrease. One has to bear in mind, however, that a reliable 
institutional framework is the prerequisite for people to extend their planning horizons and 
to make saving a rational behaviour. At a later stage of the transition process, further 
institutional improvements will possibly reduce saving through precautionary motives. In 
our study, however, we could not detect this latter effect for the countries under 
consideration. Our finding seems to be in contrast to that of Denizer & Wolf (2000), who 
used a liberalisation index to measure institutional development, and determined that a 
negative correlation exists between the liberalisation of an economy and saving. 
Nevertheless, we have to mention the differences in the construction of both indicators: 
while the liberalisation index used by Denizer & Wolf considers internal and external 
prices as well as the private sector entry, the EBRD transition indicator reflects the 
“transformation” in the areas of enterprise restructuring, competition policy, and bank and 
security sector reforms. Thus the indicators themselves are at the root of important 
conceptual differences between their study and ours. 
Uncertainty 
Inflation was used as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. According to our 
estimations, it is only significant in the equation for the domestic saving ratio, which 
reflects the sum of private and governmental savings: that is, it includes the fiscal balance. 
We found that a reduction of inflation leads to a reduction of savings. Loayza, Schmidt-
Hebbel and Servén (1999), who obtained similar results, explained this phenomenon by 
the precautionary motive for saving. Nevertheless, the positive correlation between 
inflation and domestic saving seems puzzling. We have to bear in mind, however, that 
from a government’s point of view, revenues resulting from inflation taxes and 
seigniorage increase with higher prices, thereby broadening the base for governmental ___________________   BACK ON TRACK? SAVINGS PUZZLES IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES   ________________  
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saving. Furthermore, more conceptual arguments that saving can also be achieved via 
dollarisation and capital flight may offer an interesting explanation for this result. Both 
dollarisation and capital flight are part of “domestic savings” and these phenomena are 
observed especially during times of high and volatile inflation as a means of value 
protection. These forms of savings are not connected with domestic investment and are 
therefore unfavourable for the catching-up process. 
International financial integration 
In our study, the current account deficit was used as a proxy for foreign borrowing, since 
it implies that a country receives credit from other countries. Assuming that domestic 
savings and foreign capital may be substitutes, it is expected that a higher current account 
deficit is linked to reductions in domestic savings. These expectations are supported by the 
estimation results. Since the time series for the current account deficit includes negative 
values and the estimated coefficient is positive, an increase in the current account deficit 
(e.g. larger negative values) decreases savings. This finding supports the idea that the EU 
accession countries have relatively good access to the international financial market and 
that domestic savings and foreign capital operate at least partly as substitutes.  
Fiscal policy 
The public saving ratio was only included in the equation for the private saving ratio. As 
shown in Table 2b, public saving has a highly significant negative effect on private 
saving: a rise in public saving of 1 percentage point reduces private saving by about 0.6 
percent. This means that public saving crowds out private saving to a large extent. There is 
no empirical evidence, however, for a one-to-one relationship, as suggested by the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem. 
 
Table 2a. Results for the fixed-effects model 
Dependent variable: gross domestic savings as a share of GDP 
Model 7  Coefficient 
Panel-corrected 
Standard Errors 
z-Statistic 
Lagged domestic saving rate   0.41**  0.08  5.2 
Lagged growth rate of real GDP  0.18**
c 0.07  2.5 
Old-age dependency ratio  -1.73**  0.80  -2.2 
Inflation 3.43**  0.99  3.5 
Current account deficit  0.25**  0.09  2.8 
Lagged EBRD transition indicator  3.34**  0.96  3.5 
Obs 78     
R
2 °  0.59    
Notes: 
°There is no precise counterpart to R
2 in the generalised regression model. The R
2 from the 
transformed model is purely descriptive (see Greene 1999:467). Therefore, we displayed the R
2 from 
the original model, because it shows the fit of the model of interest. 
 a ln(1+πt) 
** significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2b. Results for the fixed-effects model  
Dependent variable: private savings as a share of GDP 
Model 7  Coefficient 
Panel-corrected 
Standard Errors 
z-Statistic 
Lagged private saving rate  0.33**  0.10  3.4 
Lagged growth rate of real GDP  0.11  0.07  1.5 
Lagged real per-capita income
a 9.59**  2.68  3.6 
Old-age dependency ratio  -2.06**  0.79  -2.6 
Current account deficit  0.28**  0.06  4.3 
Public saving rate  -0.58**  0.12  -5.0 
Lagged EBRD transition indicator  2.26**  1.19  1.9 
Obs 78     
R
2 °  0.66     
Notes:
° There is no precise counterpart to R
2 in the generalised regression model. The R
2 from the 
transformed model is purely descriptive (see Greene 1999:467). Therefore, we displayed the R
2 from 
the original model, because it shows the fit of the model of interest. 
a ln 
** significant at the 5% level. 
In Table 2a and Table 2b, only the determinants that have a significant influence on saving are 
presented. The influence of further variables that have often been used in empirical analyses 
was also checked. But they had been omitted from this study’s estimation equations since they 
turned out to be insignificant in each case (see Table A2a and Table A2b, Appendix). Credit 
provision to the private sector, which is usually used to model the budget constraint of the 
private household, did not show any signs of having an influence on saving behaviour. Many 
empirical analyses use M2/GDP as a proxy for the performance of the financial sector. 
Nevertheless, in this study, this variable was completely insignificant. Finally, the real interest 
rate always had a positive sign but it was always insignificant. Since the real interest rate was 
calculated as nominal deposit rate minus inflation of the previous period to take expectations 
concerning future price development into account, the positive sign indicates that an expected 
increase in prices will increase savings. This is in line with our findings on inflation. 
6. Conclusions 
After the dramatic drop in domestic saving that took place in the early years of transition, 
saving rates in many EU accession countries soon recovered and have remained relatively 
stable during recent years. This development may indicate that a process of radical change has 
come to an end: a period that commenced with high involuntary saving has ended with 
market-driven saving. Are the EU accession countries now “back on track” with their saving 
patterns? Does this imply that a convergence in motives has also been achieved? Is saving in 
the EU accession countries now driven by the same forces as it is in market economies?  
Our results for the EU accession countries are very much in line with the findings reported by 
the World Bank project for emerging and industrialised market economies (Loayza, Schmidt-
Hebbe and Servén, 1999). This leads us to the conclusion that saving in the EU accession 
countries is to a large extent driven by the same forces as saving in Western market ___________________   BACK ON TRACK? SAVINGS PUZZLES IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES   ________________  
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economies: Savings rates inherit a certain degree of persistence; positive changes in both the 
level of income and income growth positively influences saving; the old-age dependency ratio 
is negatively related to saving, and relaxing the international borrowing constraint decreases 
saving. Finally, public saving crowds out private saving, but there is not evidence for 
Ricardian effects. Furthermore, there is a remarkable similarity in terms of sign and 
significance of the estimated coefficients for the determinants of the domestic and the private 
saving ratio, a phenomenon that is also reported for the World Bank project. 
Additionally, one interesting aspect can be reported: the EBRD transition indicator used to 
measure the quality of the external institutional framework turned out to be significantly 
positive. In other words, better institutions promote higher savings. This finding may be 
surprising considering that better institutions lead to less uncertainty and may therefore reduce 
saving through precautionary motives. Nevertheless, the first effect of reliable institutions is 
that they enable people to level out their consumption over time expanding their planning 
horizons – thus making saving more attractive. After this, however, such institutional 
improvements also reduce uncertainty, possibly leading to a new wave of reduction in saving.  
To sum up, there is strong evidence that the EU accession countries are “back on track” with 
their saving patterns. We found out that saving in these countries is now, to a large extent, 
driven by the same forces as those in market economies. Although the motives for savings 
seem to be quite similar within our group of countries, the resulting saving rates are still 
different. This is attributable to many factors, such as the difference in the growth rate etc. If 
we assume that saving does play an important role in investment, then we are faced with the 
question of how to promote saving in the countries under consideration. Regarding the 
estimation results, two strategies seem to be appropriate: First, since income and growth 
positively influence saving, spurring development is an effective way to increase saving. 
Second, institutional development seems to be another important way to foster saving. 
Therefore, further research on the linkages and channels between institutional development 
and saving seems to be necessary.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. List of data sources 
Data  Source 
Demographic Structure   
Dependency ratios  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
  Youth dependency ratio  World  Bank, World Development Indicators, 
own calculations 
 Old-age  dependency  ratio  World  Bank, World Development Indicators,
own calculations 
Economic Development   
GDP per capita  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
own calculations 
GDP  growth  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
National Statistics 
Domestic saving  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Unemployment National  Statistics 
Current  account  balance  World Bank, World Development Indicators,
International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics 
Monetary and Financial Market Indicators   
CPI National  Statistics 
Private  or  domestic  credit  International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics 
Interest  rates  International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics 
Real interest rate  Own calculations 
M2/GDP  International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, own calculations 
Government   
Budget deficit (Government) National  Statistics 
Transition  indicator  European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
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Table A2a. Domestic saving: Alternative specifications (Dependent variable: gross domestic savings as a share of GDP) 
 
 
OLS with panel-corrected standard errors that account for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporanous correlation;
z-statistic in brackets 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lagged domestic saving rate  0.45** 
(4.8) 
0.45** 
(5.5) 
0.45** 
(6.8) 
0.43** 
(5.1) 
0.49** 
(5.6) 
0.41** 
(4.9) 
0.41** 
(5.2) 
Lagged growth rate of real GDP  0.25** 
(3.6) 
0.25** 
(3.8) 
0.21** 
(3.4) 
0.21** 
(3.4) 
0.24** 
(3.6) 
0.18** 
(2.5) 
0.18** 
(2.5) 
Lagged real per-capita income
a  -0.06 
(-0.0)        
Youth dependency ratio  -0.39* 
(-1.8) 
-0.39** 
(-2.0) 
-0.50** 
(-2.5) 
-0.19 
(-1.4) 
-0.27 
(-1.2) 
-0.07 
(-0.3) 
 
Old-age dependency ratio  -1.47* 
(-1.7) 
-1.46* 
(-1.8) 
-0.96 
(-1.3) 
-0.07 
(-0.2) 
-1.7** 
(-1.9) 
-1.9** 
(-2.2) 
-1.73** 
(-2.2) 
Inflation
b  2.54** 
(2.6) 
2.54** 
(2.6) 
2.4** 
(2.3) 
2.02** 
(2.2) 
2.62** 
(2.7) 
3.38** 
(3.3) 
3.43** 
(3.5) 
Real interest rate
c     0.96 
(1.2)       
Current account deficit  0.28** 
(3.4) 
0.28** 
(3.3) 
0.34** 
(4.7) 
0.31** 
(4.0) 
0.26** 
(2.9) 
0.25** 
(2.9) 
0.25** 
(2.8) 
EBRD transition indicator          1.16 
(1.0) 
  
Lagged EBRD transition indicator           3.25** 
(3.0)  
3.34** 
(3.5) 
M2/GDP       0.01 
(0.2) 
   
Obs  81 81 76 79 81 78 78 
R
2 °  0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 
°  There is no precise counterpart to R
2 in the generalised regression model. The R
2 from the transformed model is purely descriptive (see Greene 1999:467).  
  Therefore we displayed the R
2 from the original model, because it shows the fit of the model of interest. 
a ln    
b ln(1+πt)    
c ln(1+it)-ln(1+πt-1)     
* and **: significant at the 10% and 5% level; ___________________________________________________________   SCHROOTEN  & STEPHAN   _________________________________________________________  
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Table A2b. Private saving: Alternative specifications (Dependent variable: private savings as a share of GDP) 
  OLS with panel-corrected standard errors that account for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporanous correlation; 
z-statistic in brackets 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lagged private saving rate  0.36** 
(3.8) 
0.36** 
(3.9) 
0.40** 
(4.5) 
0.32** 
(3.6) 
0.40** 
(4.4) 
0.35** 
(3.7) 
0.33** 
(3.4) 
Lagged growth rate of real GDP  0.16** 
(2.6) 
0.16** 
(2.7) 
0.16** 
(2.1) 
0.11** 
(1.9) 
0.21** 
(3.3) 
0.14* 
(1.9) 
0.11 
(1.51) 
Lagged real per-capita income
a  6.83** 
(2.4) 
6.83** 
(2.4) 
1.85 
(0.4) 
0.39 
(0.1) 
5.01 
(0.9) 
9.49** 
(2.3) 
9.59** 
(3.6) 
Youth dependency ratio  -0.35 
(-1.5) 
-0.35 
(-1.5) 
-0.61** 
(-2.2) 
-0.45 
(-1.5) 
-0.44 
(-1.4) 
-0.05 
(-0.2) 
 
Old-age dependency ratio 
-1.9** 
(-2.0) 
-1.91** 
(-2.0) 
-1.74** 
(-2.1) 
-0.51 
(-0.8) 
-1.10 
(-1.2) 
-1.95* 
(-2.2) 
-2.06** 
(-2.6) 
Inflation
b  0.14 
(0.1)        
Real interest rate
c      0.93 
(0.9)      
Current account deficit  0.27** 
(3.6) 
0.27** 
(3.9) 
0.34** 
(4.9) 
0.33** 
(3.3) 
0.34** 
(4.0) 
0.25** 
(3.0) 
0.28** 
(4.3) 
Credit provision for private sector       -0.02 
(-0.3) 
  
Public saving rate  -0.59** 
(-5.0) 
-0.59** 
(-5.0) 
-0.59** 
(-3.9) 
-0.58** 
(-4.5) 
-0.69** 
(-4.3) 
-0.57** 
(-4.8) 
-0.58** 
(-5.0) 
EBRD transition indicator  
 
    
1.90 
(1.0) 
 
Lagged EBRD transition indicator           2.26* 
(1.9) 
M2/GDP      0.06 
(0.9)      
Obs  78 78 73 76 71 78 78 
R
2 °  0.64 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.66 
°  There is no precise counterpart to R
2 in the generalised regression model. The R
2 from the transformed model is purely descriptive (see Greene 1999:467).   
  Therefore we displayed the R
2 from the original model, because it shows the fit of the model of interest. 
a ln    
b ln(1+πt)    
c ln(1+it)-ln(1+πt-1)     
* and **: significant at the 10% and 5% level;ABOUT ENEPRI 
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